Since the realpolitik of European relations in the mid-19th century had already shaped the progression of Russo-American relations, unsurprisingly the relationships between Britain, France, the United States, and Russia would shape American policy regarding Poland. In May, Britain and France requested that the United States join an official statement of disapproval.[2] As discussed, Britain and France had become the unofficial counterbalance to the de facto alignment of the United States and Russia, and therefore the American refusal to intervene reinforced this friendship.
The language of American diplomats at that time, however, reveals that American unity was not simply a practical response to geopolitics. In his official response to the French, Secretary of State William Seward referenced the “enlightened and humane character” of Alexander II, so described for his emancipation of the serfs and “effective administration of justice.”[3] Such high language demonstrated the respect for Russia that the American government openly espoused, especially in light of its own recent emancipation. Somewhat less appealing was the private comment of Cassius Clay, minister to Russia. In a reply to Seward in June 1863, Clay contrasted “liberal Russia” with “reactionary, Catholic and despotic Poland.”[4] At least privately, enthusiasm for Russia both as an ally and a fellow emancipator could lead American diplomats to criticize the Polish insurrection as the enemy of progressive Russian rule.
[1] Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” Polish-American Studies 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 92.
[2] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 136-137.
[3] Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 667.
[4] “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection,” 94.
The Polish Insurrection demonstrates the extent to which American diplomacy prioritized a strong relationship with Russia during the Civil War. In January 1863, protests against conscription in Poland exploded into a general rebellion against Russian rule.[1] The official diplomatic response of the United States reveals both the geopolitical conception of Russia as an unofficial ally and the perception of Alexander II as a respectable and just ruler.
Since the realpolitik of European relations in the mid-19th century had already shaped the progression of Russo-American relations, unsurprisingly the relationships between Britain, France, the United States, and Russia would shape American policy regarding Poland. In May, Britain and France requested that the United States join an official statement of disapproval.[2] As discussed, Britain and France had become the unofficial counterbalance to the de facto alignment of the United States and Russia, and therefore the American refusal to intervene reinforced this friendship.
The language of American diplomats at that time, however, reveals that American unity was not simply a practical response to geopolitics. In his official response to the French, Secretary of State William Seward referenced the “enlightened and humane character” of Alexander II, so described for his emancipation of the serfs and “effective administration of justice.”[3] Such high language demonstrated the respect for Russia that the American government openly espoused, especially in light of its own recent emancipation. Somewhat less appealing was the private comment of Cassius Clay, minister to Russia. In a reply to Seward in June 1863, Clay contrasted “liberal Russia” with “reactionary, Catholic and despotic Poland.”[4] At least privately, enthusiasm for Russia both as an ally and a fellow emancipator could lead American diplomats to criticize the Polish insurrection as the enemy of progressive Russian rule.
[1] Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” Polish-American Studies 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 92.
[2] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 136-137.
[3] Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 667.
[4] “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection,” 94.
Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” Polish-American Studies 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 90-98.
Since the Russian government had already extended its first words of support by 1861, Russia was certainly pleased to see the United States avoid open war with Britain. The Russian minister to the United States passed along a note of congratulations and reassurance “of the cordial sympathy which united the two countries.”[3] To emphasize this point on the world stage, the Russian government likewise sought permission from Cassius Clay to “have [the congratulations] printed in the Journal de St Petersbourg in order that it might exercise a favorable influence on European opinion.”[4] In going to such public lengths to emphasize Russo-American friendship, the Russian government gave its reassurance that it supported the United States against British and French enmity.
]]>Although the “Trent Affair” did not directly involve Russia, the affair demonstrated the need for the United States to bolster its diplomatic presence against British and French interests. In November 1861, the British government reacted angrily to news that an American ship had intercepted the British ship Trent. An American warship stopped the Trent, in international waters, in order to intercept “John Slidell and James Mason, Confederate emissaries to Paris and London, respectively.”[1] Britain demanded recompense for what it considered an illegal seizure of a British ship, and ultimately the United States released Slidell and Mason on the basis that “one war at a time” was a prudent measure.[2] Even with the peaceful resolution, the incident highlighted the extent of Confederate efforts to sway European powers and the less-than-favorable position that the United States held in British opinion.
Since the Russian government had already extended its first words of support by 1861, Russia was certainly pleased to see the United States avoid open war with Britain. The Russian minister to the United States passed along a note of congratulations and reassurance “of the cordial sympathy which united the two countries.”[3] To emphasize this point on the world stage, the Russian government likewise sought permission from Cassius Clay to “have [the congratulations] printed in the Journal de St Petersbourg in order that it might exercise a favorable influence on European opinion.”[4] In going to such public lengths to emphasize Russo-American friendship, the Russian government gave its reassurance that it supported the United States against British and French enmity.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Albert A. Woldman. Lincoln and the Russians. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.