In fact, Russia had been hoping to dispose of Alaska in some way even before the Civil War, out of fear that the United Kingdom could easily seize it.[1] Selling the territory to the United States, according to both Clay and the Russian minister to the United States, would in fact play a dual role in countering British power on the Pacific. In addition to keeping Alaska out of the hands of the British, the sale of Alaska may have been driven by the hope of “expulsion of England from the whole Pacific coast of North America.”[2] As with Russian alignment against Britain and France during the Civil War, the exigencies of geopolitics played a significant role in fostering this agreement over Alaska.
Famously, the purchase of Alaska by the United States was greeted with much derision at the time. Despite some public outcry over purchasing the “Russian Fairyland,”[3] the annexation of Alaska was indeed secured in 1867 for the sum of $7.2 million.[4]
]]>Although the American purchase of Alaska occurred after the Civil War, the treaty came about as a result of the same diplomatic circumstances that brought about Russo-American cooperation during the Civil War. The antagonism between Russia and Britain had played a significant role in fostering Russia’s open diplomatic support for the Union, and fears of war over Poland had driven Russia to send its fleet on their 1863 visit to the United States.
In fact, Russia had been hoping to dispose of Alaska in some way even before the Civil War, out of fear that the United Kingdom could easily seize it.[1] Selling the territory to the United States, according to both Clay and the Russian minister to the United States, would in fact play a dual role in countering British power on the Pacific. In addition to keeping Alaska out of the hands of the British, the sale of Alaska may have been driven by the hope of “expulsion of England from the whole Pacific coast of North America.”[2] As with Russian alignment against Britain and France during the Civil War, the exigencies of geopolitics played a significant role in fostering this agreement over Alaska.
Famously, the purchase of Alaska by the United States was greeted with much derision at the time. Despite some public outcry over purchasing the “Russian Fairyland,”[3] the annexation of Alaska was indeed secured in 1867 for the sum of $7.2 million.[4]
Thomas A. Bailey. America Faces Russia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Both the diplomatic reception to an unexpected naval visit and the lavish private receptions in New York City demonstrate the extent to which Russia had been established as a friendly power. One reception for the Russian officers served “twelve thousand oysters, twelve hundred game birds, and three thousand five hundred bottles of wine.”[1] The official receptions were no less dramatic, and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles gave the Russians open access to visit the Brooklyn navy yard.[2] In December, Secretary Seward received the Russians in Washington, D.C., and Mary Todd Lincoln herself gave “a toast to the health of the Czar.”[3] The warm reception reiterated the level of friendship between the two countries, such that a Russian fleet could suddenly arrive on the East Coast and be feted.
Russia’s dispatch of ships to New York, and later San Francisco, came not necessarily as a show of support for the Union, but rather out of fear of British and French intervention in Poland. Since the United States had declined interest in intervention on behalf of the Polish rebels, the Russian fleet seemed much safer near American waters than directly facing British and French navies.[4] For the Russians, fostering a sense of good will was important, but secondary to their goal of keeping their navy intact in case of a war with Britain and France.
]]>On September 24, 1863, Russian ships suddenly appeared off the coast of New York City. Although the appearance of a foreign navy during the Civil War might seem to have been menacing, both the American government and private society welcomed the presence of the Russian fleet.
Both the diplomatic reception to an unexpected naval visit and the lavish private receptions in New York City demonstrate the extent to which Russia had been established as a friendly power. One reception for the Russian officers served “twelve thousand oysters, twelve hundred game birds, and three thousand five hundred bottles of wine.”[1] The official receptions were no less dramatic, and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles gave the Russians open access to visit the Brooklyn navy yard.[2] In December, Secretary Seward received the Russians in Washington, D.C., and Mary Todd Lincoln herself gave “a toast to the health of the Czar.”[3] The warm reception reiterated the level of friendship between the two countries, such that a Russian fleet could suddenly arrive on the East Coast and be feted.
Russia’s dispatch of ships to New York, and later San Francisco, came not necessarily as a show of support for the Union, but rather out of fear of British and French intervention in Poland. Since the United States had declined interest in intervention on behalf of the Polish rebels, the Russian fleet seemed much safer near American waters than directly facing British and French navies.[4] For the Russians, fostering a sense of good will was important, but secondary to their goal of keeping their navy intact in case of a war with Britain and France.
Benjamin F. Gilbert, “Welcome to the Czar’s Fleet.” California Historical Society Quarterly 26, no. 1 (Mar. 1947): 13-19
Albert A. Woldman. Lincoln and the Russians. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.
Since the realpolitik of European relations in the mid-19th century had already shaped the progression of Russo-American relations, unsurprisingly the relationships between Britain, France, the United States, and Russia would shape American policy regarding Poland. In May, Britain and France requested that the United States join an official statement of disapproval.[2] As discussed, Britain and France had become the unofficial counterbalance to the de facto alignment of the United States and Russia, and therefore the American refusal to intervene reinforced this friendship.
The language of American diplomats at that time, however, reveals that American unity was not simply a practical response to geopolitics. In his official response to the French, Secretary of State William Seward referenced the “enlightened and humane character” of Alexander II, so described for his emancipation of the serfs and “effective administration of justice.”[3] Such high language demonstrated the respect for Russia that the American government openly espoused, especially in light of its own recent emancipation. Somewhat less appealing was the private comment of Cassius Clay, minister to Russia. In a reply to Seward in June 1863, Clay contrasted “liberal Russia” with “reactionary, Catholic and despotic Poland.”[4] At least privately, enthusiasm for Russia both as an ally and a fellow emancipator could lead American diplomats to criticize the Polish insurrection as the enemy of progressive Russian rule.
[1] Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” Polish-American Studies 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 92.
[2] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 136-137.
[3] Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 667.
[4] “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection,” 94.
The Polish Insurrection demonstrates the extent to which American diplomacy prioritized a strong relationship with Russia during the Civil War. In January 1863, protests against conscription in Poland exploded into a general rebellion against Russian rule.[1] The official diplomatic response of the United States reveals both the geopolitical conception of Russia as an unofficial ally and the perception of Alexander II as a respectable and just ruler.
Since the realpolitik of European relations in the mid-19th century had already shaped the progression of Russo-American relations, unsurprisingly the relationships between Britain, France, the United States, and Russia would shape American policy regarding Poland. In May, Britain and France requested that the United States join an official statement of disapproval.[2] As discussed, Britain and France had become the unofficial counterbalance to the de facto alignment of the United States and Russia, and therefore the American refusal to intervene reinforced this friendship.
The language of American diplomats at that time, however, reveals that American unity was not simply a practical response to geopolitics. In his official response to the French, Secretary of State William Seward referenced the “enlightened and humane character” of Alexander II, so described for his emancipation of the serfs and “effective administration of justice.”[3] Such high language demonstrated the respect for Russia that the American government openly espoused, especially in light of its own recent emancipation. Somewhat less appealing was the private comment of Cassius Clay, minister to Russia. In a reply to Seward in June 1863, Clay contrasted “liberal Russia” with “reactionary, Catholic and despotic Poland.”[4] At least privately, enthusiasm for Russia both as an ally and a fellow emancipator could lead American diplomats to criticize the Polish insurrection as the enemy of progressive Russian rule.
[1] Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” Polish-American Studies 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 92.
[2] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 136-137.
[3] Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 667.
[4] “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection,” 94.
Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Joseph Wieczerzak, “American Reactions to the Polish Insurrection.” Polish-American Studies 22, no. 2. (Jul.-Dec., 1965): 90-98.
However, these attributes seem not to have impaired his mission or the general state of Russo-American relations. Clay in fact was one of the most ideological supporters of Russia, and he never hesitated to tell both Americans and Russians that the two nations were united by more than diplomatic necessity. Upon the return of the Russian fleet from the United States, Clay explained the warm welcome given to them as American recognition of the “common cause in the advancement of humanity.”[3] Although the natural alignment of Russia and the United States against Britain and France meant that good relations were bound to occur, Clay’s efforts went beyond not doing anything to impair that friendship. The gun-toting Kentuckian’s high praise of Russia provided the most forceful defense of Russo-American friendship in the Lincoln administration.
[1] John Kuhn Bliemaier, “Cassius Marcellus Clay in St. Petersburg.” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 73, no. 3 (July, 1975): 264.
[2] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 104.
[3] Alexander Tarsaidze, Czars and Presidents. (New York: Mcdowell Obolensky, 1958), 222.
Cassius Marcellus Clay served as minister to Russia for two terms: first from July 14, 1861 to June 25, 1862, and again from May 7, 1863 to October 1, 1869. His tenure as minister was marked by a successful alignment of Russia with American interests during the Civil War. Clay himself seemed an unusual choice for the ministry to Russia, and it seems that his appointment to a diplomatic position was a political reward for his loyal campaigning for Lincoln.[1] Clay himself was unique as a Kentucky Republican and abolitionist, and he was also known as a “firebrand” who carried “a bowie knife and two pistols” for his own defense.[2]
However, these attributes seem not to have impaired his mission or the general state of Russo-American relations. Clay in fact was one of the most ideological supporters of Russia, and he never hesitated to tell both Americans and Russians that the two nations were united by more than diplomatic necessity. Upon the return of the Russian fleet from the United States, Clay explained the warm welcome given to them as American recognition of the “common cause in the advancement of humanity.”[3] Although the natural alignment of Russia and the United States against Britain and France meant that good relations were bound to occur, Clay’s efforts went beyond not doing anything to impair that friendship. The gun-toting Kentuckian’s high praise of Russia provided the most forceful defense of Russo-American friendship in the Lincoln administration.
[1] John Kuhn Bliemaier, “Cassius Marcellus Clay in St. Petersburg.” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 73, no. 3 (July, 1975): 264.
[2] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 104.
[3] Alexander Tarsaidze, Czars and Presidents. (New York: Mcdowell Obolensky, 1958), 222.
John Kuhn Bliemaier, “Cassius Marcellus Clay in St. Petersburg.” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 73, no. 3 (July, 1975): 263-287.
Alexander Tarsaidze, Czars and Presidents. New York: Mcdowell Obolensky, 1958.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Since the Russian government had already extended its first words of support by 1861, Russia was certainly pleased to see the United States avoid open war with Britain. The Russian minister to the United States passed along a note of congratulations and reassurance “of the cordial sympathy which united the two countries.”[3] To emphasize this point on the world stage, the Russian government likewise sought permission from Cassius Clay to “have [the congratulations] printed in the Journal de St Petersbourg in order that it might exercise a favorable influence on European opinion.”[4] In going to such public lengths to emphasize Russo-American friendship, the Russian government gave its reassurance that it supported the United States against British and French enmity.
]]>Although the “Trent Affair” did not directly involve Russia, the affair demonstrated the need for the United States to bolster its diplomatic presence against British and French interests. In November 1861, the British government reacted angrily to news that an American ship had intercepted the British ship Trent. An American warship stopped the Trent, in international waters, in order to intercept “John Slidell and James Mason, Confederate emissaries to Paris and London, respectively.”[1] Britain demanded recompense for what it considered an illegal seizure of a British ship, and ultimately the United States released Slidell and Mason on the basis that “one war at a time” was a prudent measure.[2] Even with the peaceful resolution, the incident highlighted the extent of Confederate efforts to sway European powers and the less-than-favorable position that the United States held in British opinion.
Since the Russian government had already extended its first words of support by 1861, Russia was certainly pleased to see the United States avoid open war with Britain. The Russian minister to the United States passed along a note of congratulations and reassurance “of the cordial sympathy which united the two countries.”[3] To emphasize this point on the world stage, the Russian government likewise sought permission from Cassius Clay to “have [the congratulations] printed in the Journal de St Petersbourg in order that it might exercise a favorable influence on European opinion.”[4] In going to such public lengths to emphasize Russo-American friendship, the Russian government gave its reassurance that it supported the United States against British and French enmity.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Albert A. Woldman. Lincoln and the Russians. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.
[1] “Everett, Edward.” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000264
[2] Edward Everett. “The Sympathy of Russia with the United States, Views of Edward Everett,” New York Herald, reprinted in New York Times, October 15, 1861.
[3] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 129.
Alexander II, as the Tsar-Emancipator, provided ideological abolitionists with a new face of Russia that could dispel the previous notions of Russian autocracy and despotism. As noted in the exhibit, Alexander II signed a declaration of emancipation on March 3, 1861. The emancipation of the serfs played a great role in boosting esteem of him among abolitionist Americans as a fellow reformer against forces supporting the regressive Confederacy. Thus, Edward Everett, a Massachusetts politician (and president of Harvard University),[1] wrote in glowing terms of the “enlightened Prince” who gave his support to the Union against a Confederacy openly avowing its foundation on “the cornerstone of Slavery.”[2] Cassius Clay would echo such praise after his own personal encounters with the Tsar. He told one American audience in 1862 that “not only Alexander, but his whole family are with you, men, women, and children.”[3] Even if much of the Russo-American alignment had been built on resisting Britain and France, American abolitionists saw Alexander II as a personal friend and one of the few world leaders advocating a process of reform similar to that of American emancipation.
[1] “Everett, Edward.” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000264
[2] Edward Everett. “The Sympathy of Russia with the United States, Views of Edward Everett,” New York Herald, reprinted in New York Times, October 15, 1861.
[3] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 129.
Edward Everett. “The Sympathy of Russia with the United States, Views of Edward Everett,” New York Herald, reprinted in New York Times, October 15, 1861.
"Everett, Edward.” Biographical Directory of the United States Congress. http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=E000264
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
The sudden flurry of diplomatic activity between the United States and Russia likewise helped to give American and Russian diplomats familiarity with each other. The Russian minister to the United States at this time, Eduard de Stoeckl, would later serve throughout the Civil War period.[2] Stoeckl would prove to be a key intermediary between the two countries, and he did not hesitate to make public the diplomatic notes of friendship between his two countries.[3] Given the positive state of relations between the two countries as a result of the Crimean War, in 1861 the United States and Russia were well-primed for further conciliation against potential British and French threats.
[1] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 112.
[2] Frank A. Golder, “Russo-American Relations during the Crimean War.” The American Historical Review, 31 no. 3 (April 1926): 463.
[3] Albert A. Woldman. Lincoln and the Russians. (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952), 130.
During the mid-1850s, the events of the Crimean War expanded what had been minimal interaction between the United States and Russia. Although the United States remained neutral during the war, the question of shipping neutrality first raised the notion that the United States and Russia could benefit from working in concert to resist British influence. The United States, throughout the war, made known to Britain and France its principle that “free ships make free goods” and that American trade, as a non-belligerent power, would not halt in Russia.[1] Fortunately, the Crimean War passed without this becoming an active point of contention between Britain and the United States. The war still served as a hint that even before British and French involvement in the Civil War, the United States might be served by finding a counterbalance to those two countries in Russia.
The sudden flurry of diplomatic activity between the United States and Russia likewise helped to give American and Russian diplomats familiarity with each other. The Russian minister to the United States at this time, Eduard de Stoeckl, would later serve throughout the Civil War period.[2] Stoeckl would prove to be a key intermediary between the two countries, and he did not hesitate to make public the diplomatic notes of friendship between his two countries.[3] Given the positive state of relations between the two countries as a result of the Crimean War, in 1861 the United States and Russia were well-primed for further conciliation against potential British and French threats.
[1] Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930), 112.
[2] Frank A. Golder, “Russo-American Relations during the Crimean War.” The American Historical Review, 31 no. 3 (April 1926): 463.
[3] Albert A. Woldman. Lincoln and the Russians. (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952), 130.
Frank A. Golder, “Russo-American Relations during the Crimean War.” The American Historical Review, 31 no. 3 (April 1926): 462-476.
Benjamin Platt Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 1815-1867. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1930.
Albert A. Woldman. Lincoln and the Russians. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1952.